The Ethiopian government announced earlier this month the closure of the most notorious prison in the country, including the release of political prisoners. But there is a lot of uncertainty about the implementation of that decision and critics fear that real reforms will fail.
Maekelawi, Ethiopia’s most notorious prison, can be found in the old part of the capital, a popular nightlife area where it is noisy in the weekends until early in the morning. One of the many contrasts in this country with often painful contradictions.
The prison has been associated with torture and violence for decades, a symbol of the dark side of the authoritarian regime in the so-called Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.
At the beginning of this month, the Ethiopian minister Hailemariam Desalegn unexpectedly announced that the prison closes and prisoners will be released, including people belonging to political parties.
Since that announcement, however, several statements by the government have caused confusion, and this leads to questions about its sincerity. For example, it is unclear how the closure should take place in practice and when the prisoners are released.
What most observers are more certain about is that this issue illustrates the scale and speed of the changes among the four parties that make up the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRFD).
“The decision was a concession to the strong demand of the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDP) that governs the state of Oromia,” says Awol Allo, an Ethiopian law teacher at Keele University in the United Kingdom, who says he can not return to Ethiopia because there is a chance that he will be arrested there.
The EPRFD was an idea of the People’s Liberation Front of Tigray (TPLF), a Marxist-Leninist movement that played an important role in the victory over the former military regime in Ethiopia, the Derg, and the liberation of the Tigray region. The ethnic Tigray make up only 6.5 percent of the more than 100 million Ethiopians.
In the last days of the civil war in Ethiopia, TPLF initiated the creation of three satellite parties from the rebel forces: the OPDO, the Amharic National Democratic Movement (ANDM) and the South Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM). These parties had to represent the different ethnic populations, but it also strengthened the power of the TPLF after the fall of the Derg in 1991.
This power was expressed, among other things, by the dominant position of the TPLF in business and the economy, and also in the military and security apparatus of the country. This to the dissatisfaction of other ethnic groups, especially the Oromo.
The Oromo make up 35 percent of the population of Ethiopia and are the largest ethnic group. They also make up the largest part of the detainees in Maekelawi and the other prisons in the country. This, says Allo, can not simply be explained by the percentage of Oromo in the population.
‘There is disproportionate and arbitrary repression in relation to the Oromo,’ says Awol Allo. ‘It is the largest ethnic population group and is therefore seen as a threat.’
In the eyes of the government, this assumed threat has only increased since November 2015, when the Oromo took to the streets in protest. That same protest movement still exists. The government also experiences threats from other ethnic groups, such as the Somali.
The demonstrating Oromo received approval from Amharen in 2016. Together, the two ethnic groups make up 67 percent of the population.
The government is now trying to do something about the dissatisfaction, which poses a threat to instability in the country. Instability that may even endanger the survival of the country itself. But appeasing measures, such as the current announcement, are only effective if they are actually implemented.
“The EPRFD has taken responsibility for the political crisis in the country and apologized for failing leadership and undemocratic actions,” said Lidetu Ayele, founder of the Ethiopian Democratic Party, an opposition party. “But she does not recognize the presence of political prisoners in this country. That contradicts each other and shows that the ruling party does not intend to actually reform. ‘
The EPRFD has been criticized for a long time – both nationally and internationally – because it uses draconian anti-terrorism measures to secure political opponents and then denies that there are political prisoners. Human rights groups, however, estimate that their number is in the tens of thousands.
However, with the announcement about Maekelawi and the release of prisoners, the government seems to break with the past and recognize the existence of political prisoners. But soon after the announcement the government made withdrawing movements. Government spokespersons were unclear about what was meant by political prisoners.
“The announcement of the release of prisoners is symptomatic of the lack of organization, if not cacophony, under the leadership,” says René Lefort, who has been visiting and publishing the country since 1974.
‘This decision could have been the best proof of the sincerity of the EPRFD to initiate a democratization process. But since it has been announced in various versions and essential information is lacking, such as who it is, when people are released and under what conditions, the announcement has largely lost the impact that it could have had. ‘
Political behavior and indications of internal quarrels within the government do not inspire a certain amount of confidence in some of Maekelawi’s history in the area of torture and ill-treatment, as recorded in detail by human rights organization Human Rights Watch.
“The closure of the torture chamber does not mean anything, because the government can continue with exactly the same practices in other locations,” says Alemante Selassie, emeritus professor at the William and Mary Law School in the US.
Others are less skeptical about the government’s motives. “It is not a smokescreen. This is already under discussion since the parties submitted their wishes in early 2017, ‘says Sandy Wade, a former European diplomat in Addis Ababa. ‘It is a necessary step in the run-up to the elections in 2018 and 2020, and for the future of the country, if the government wants the desired participation of opposition parties.’
On 15 January, Ethiopian Attorney General Getachew Ambaye said that the accusations against 115 detainees had been withdrawn as part of the first phase of the release of detained politicians and others.
Although he did not mention names of prominent political figures, on 17 January Merera Gudina, leader of the Federalist Party of Oromo, was released. He was arrested in 2016.
The Attorney General also said that the Southern Nations, Nationalities of Nations – a region with more than 58 ethnic groups – have withdrawn the accusations against 413 prisoners and that other regions will follow in the coming months.
At the same time, there is still a lot of distrust about an actual long-term democratization process. ‘If that happens, this is a turning point for Ethiopia,’ says Awol Allo. “Anyway, Ethiopia can not be controlled in the same way as in the past 26 years.”
For the time being there remains a big question mark: can and does the government want to make the necessary strategic changes in time, for the local elections of 2018 and the national elections of 2020?
“If the EPRFD wants to save itself and the country from the total collapse, there must be a genuine and rapid political reform that will allow the country to hold free and fair elections,” said opposition member Lidetu. “Less than that will not solve the current political crisis.”
By James Jeffrey | IPS