The utilisation gap matters because Ethiopia’s own transport ministry numbers still show almost all seaborne trade locked to Djibouti. Birr Metrics reported on August 27 that the logistics sector moved 17.57 million metric tonnes of import and export cargo in the 2025/26 financial year, and that the Port of Djibouti handled 96.71 percent of cargo passing through maritime gateways, according to figures released by State Minister Denge Boru. Djibouti handled about 15.34 million tonnes. Berbera accounted for only 2.74 percent, Tadjourah for 1.23 percent, and the Mombasa-Moyale corridor for 0.56 percent. Imports made up 15.93 million tonnes of the total, while exports stood at 1.64 million tonnes. Road transport carried 14.08 million tonnes, or about 80 percent of freight, while the Ethio-Djibouti railway moved 3.32 million tonnes. Those ministry figures show concentration, not diversification, despite years of talk in Addis Ababa about alternative corridors.
DP World took over management of Berbera under a long-term concession and has committed up to $442 million to the port’s development and expansion. The company said in 2021 that the first phase raised annual container capacity from 150,000 TEUs to 500,000, with a planned second phase that would extend the quay and lift annual capacity toward as much as two million TEUs. DP World has also developed the Berbera Economic Zone and promoted a corridor linking the port with the Ethiopian border. In 2021, the company and Ethiopia’s transport ministry signed an agreement to explore the Ethiopian side of that corridor, and partners at the time spoke of up to $1 billion in logistics investment over ten years, including dry ports, warehouses, and container yards. Ahmed still told Middle East Eye that the infrastructure is ready and that traffic growth is “only a matter of time.” Somalia Today noted that Russian grain was being prepared for onward transport to Ethiopia and South Sudan during the reporter’s visit, alongside containers from China destined for Egypt and cargo for the Somalian market. Those flows show Berbera is not idle. They do not close the gap between a 500,000 TEU design capacity and roughly 30 percent utilisation, or between Abiy Ahmed’s corridor rhetoric and the ministry’s 96.71 percent Djibouti share.
Political risk around the Berbera file has also thickened. Somalia Today noted that the disclosure came eight months after Somalia’s federal government annulled agreements with the United Arab Emirates covering Berbera, Bosaso, and Kismayo, as well as security and defence cooperation, citing what Mogadishu called violations of sovereignty. Puntland, Jubaland, and Somaliland rejected that federal decision and said their UAE agreements would remain in force. Ethiopia’s January 2024 memorandum of understanding with Somaliland over coastal access had already triggered a sovereignty dispute with Mogadishu before Turkey mediated the Ankara Declaration in December 2024. DP World’s Horn commercial director is describing a commercial underuse problem. The surrounding diplomacy helps explain why Ethiopian cargo did not shift on the scale investors once advertised.
Red Sea war risk sits beside those port arithmetic questions rather than replacing them. Al Jazeera reported on September 13 that Houthi forces had completed a takeover of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline, including Mocha and Mayyun (Perim), placing fighters close enough to complicate Bab al-Mandeb traffic that still carries a large share of global trade. IMF PortWatch data cited in that reporting pointed to a drop of roughly 50 to 55 percent in Red Sea shipping volume and tonnage between 2023 and 2025 during earlier escalation, and major operators have continued Cape of Good Hope diversions that add transit days and freight cost. Ethiopia’s transport ministry, in the same Birr Metrics release, listed regional security concerns, higher freight tariffs, volatility in global shipping, and pressure on transit corridors among the main challenges facing the logistics sector. For a landlocked economy that still pushes 96.71 percent of maritime gateway cargo through Djibouti, Bab al-Mandeb insurance premiums and Cape diversions are not abstract geopolitics. They are cost lines on the same corridor that Berbera was supposed to ease.
Readers should keep the numbers attributed. The 30 percent utilisation figure comes from Jama Mohamed Ahmed via Middle East Eye and Somalia Today, not from an independent Ethiopian customs audit. The 96.71 percent Djibouti share and 2.74 percent Berbera share come from Ministry of Transport and Logistics figures for 2025/26 as reported by Birr Metrics. Contested political claims about why Berbera remains underused, including allegations from Mogadishu analysts that UAE investment was meant to suppress competition with Jebel Ali, are assessments rather than proven cargo ledgers. What the public commercial record does show is simpler and harder for Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party to talk past: Berbera has been expanded to half a million TEUs after hundreds of millions in investment, DP World’s Horn commercial director says it is running at about 30 percent of capacity, and Ethiopia’s own ministry still routes nearly all seaborne trade through Djibouti while Berbera handles less than three percent. Port economics and shipping insurance risk are moving together along the Red Sea approaches. Diversification speeches do not unload ships.
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