That geography matters for landlocked Ethiopia because the Djibouti corridor still moves the overwhelming share of the country’s overseas cargo. The Africa Center wrote that Ethiopia’s population of about 120 million is particularly exposed because of reliance on Doraleh Port in Djibouti for about 90 percent of Ethiopian trade, a figure close to the common industry shorthand that roughly 95 percent of Ethiopia’s seaborne trade rides the same Horn port economics. Coffee, flowers, and textiles that earn foreign exchange, and imports of fuel, cereals, fertilizer, and manufacturing inputs, all depend on that corridor remaining open and affordable. When war-risk insurance and diversions rise on the Red Sea approaches to Djibouti, those costs show up in Addis Ababa as higher landed prices and thinner export margins.
Very large crude carriers have already voted with their routes. World Ports Organization reporting on September 21, drawing on S&P Global Commodities at Sea data, said no VLCCs had transited the Bab al-Mandab Strait since September 9 after only three crossings earlier that week, compared with 24 for the whole of August and 63 for July. Dryad Global senior intelligence analyst Scarlett Suarez told Platts that Mokha and Perim give the Houthis their most advantageous position on Bab el-Mandab in years, with significant risk to Saudi-associated tankers and cargoes and a higher likelihood of targeted strikes at the choke point. Platts’ Global VLCC Index for non-scrubber, no-eco ships reached about $97,000 a day on September 16, a historic high, up from about $51,900 on September 1 and about $28,300 on July 20, the same report said.
Other ship types have not abandoned the strait as completely as VLCCs, but the trend still points to thinner and more expensive traffic. Commodities at Sea data cited by World Ports showed the seven-day average of dry bulk crossings at 12.7 on September 15, down from 17.4 on July 20, while container crossings stood at 5.9 compared with 6. The Africa Center separately tracked a sharper post-July contraction in overall weekly transit volume through the Strait, from roughly 1.5 million metric tons and about 38 vessel transits between January and July peaks down toward 25 weekly vessel transits carrying about 750,000 metric tons after Houthi missile strikes resumed. For context, the Center noted that Red Sea shipping remains less than a third of pre-October 2023 levels, when weekly volume averaged about 80 vessels carrying 3.4 million metric tons.
Cape diversion freight is the expensive alternative when Bab el-Mandeb risk climbs. After the 2023 and 2024 attack waves, the Africa Center recalled, shipping lines reoriented routes around the Cape of Good Hope, adding up to two weeks and about 6,000 nautical miles and pushing Red Sea shipping insurance premiums from about 0.1 percent toward 0.7 to 1.0 percent of a ship’s value, or roughly an extra $1 million per vessel for each round trip in that earlier cycle. World Ports reporting said Saudi crude that would otherwise use Bab al-Mandab has been shifting toward Suez and Mediterranean loadings, with Cape-bound Saudi-Asia flows jumping to 58 percent of those shipments in August from 5 percent in July according to Commodities at Sea estimates. Even when Ethiopian import and export boxes still aim for Djibouti rather than Yanbu, the same war-risk stack and scarce tonnage pull rates upward across the Horn.
NNPC Marine advised members to avoid the southern Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, and the Gulf of Aden where possible, and to seek additional war risk and kidnap-and-ransom cover when a voyage cannot be delayed. UK Maritime Trade Operations and the Joint Maritime Information Center continue to warn of attack risk plus navigation-system disruption such as GNSS spoofing and AIS manipulation. The Houthis said in a September 10 statement that Red Sea shipping is “safe” aside from Saudi-linked ships, but Suarez told Platts that wider danger remains because of misidentification risk and crossfire in a widening campaign. S&P Global Market Intelligence’s Jack Kennedy said even sporadic attacks, seizures, and credible threats could raise insurance costs, delay cargoes, complicate chartering, and encourage Cape rerouting.
For Ethiopia, the Horn question is not whether Addis Ababa is a party to Yemen’s war. It is whether Abiy Ahmed’s government can keep the Djibouti lifeline affordable while Bab el-Mandeb shipping costs climb and while northern fighting already threatens the inland approaches that feed the same corridor. The Africa Center warned that Ethiopia’s vulnerability to a constrained Bab al Mandeb will push Addis to accelerate port diversification via Somaliland and Eritrea, a step that can either support cooperation or deepen regional tension. East African importers of European chemicals and manufactured goods already pay more because of longer routes, the Center said, and Ethiopia’s fuel-price pressures have been severe in 2026 reporting. Those are Horn port economics problems as much as Yemen battlefield problems.
The practical reading for Ethiopian traders and households is straightforward even when underwriters argue over exact quotes. A Houthi hold on Perim and Mokha raises the chance that Ethiopia’s Djibouti corridor pays more for war-risk insurance, waits longer for scarce tonnage, or absorbs Cape diversion freight when shipowners refuse the strait. VLCC traffic near zero since about September 9 is one market signal. Dryad’s warning about Perim and Mokha as the Houthis’ best Bab el-Mandab position in years is another. Until those positions loosen or insurance books calm, Ethiopia’s seaborne trade will keep paying a Red Sea premium that starts at Mayun and lands in Djibouti.
Sources:
Africa Center for Strategic Studies NNPC Marine Insurance World Ports Organization / Platts