Saudi Arabia had used its East-West pipeline to divert around 4 million barrels per day to the Red Sea after Iran constrained Gulf exports via Hormuz from March, Reuters reported. The kingdom shut that pipeline on September 11 after drone attacks it blamed on Iraq-based militias backed by Iran, and loadings at Yanbu had yet to resume fully according to industry sources, satellite images, and shipping data. Pankaj Khanna, CEO of Heidmar Maritime Holdings, told Reuters it was easier to work Hormuz right now because the United States provides some cover there, while the Red Sea offers “nothing” comparable for commercial ships. “If you have a Saudi connection, then you have a problem,” he said. Heidmar is avoiding Saudi ports while remaining active in both Hormuz and the Red Sea.
The Houthi factor sits at the southern gate. Reuters said Iran-aligned militants who seized swathes of the Yemeni coast and captured Perim Island in the Bab el-Mandeb strait this month have vowed to target vessels linked to Saudi Arabia because of Riyadh’s backing for Yemen’s government. Corey Ranslem of Dryad Global said Bab el-Mandeb tanker traffic remained “only a handful of vessels per day,” with dry bulk, certain products, and limited non-Saudi tankers still moving. The Saudi-led coalition said the kingdom intercepted six Houthi ballistic missiles on Thursday, including toward the Yanbu area. David Smith of McGill and Partners told Reuters the market had seen rates “certainly north of 7 percent for all calls south of Yanbu.” War-risk cover typically runs in seven-day voyage blocks and is reviewed daily, which can push a Yanbu journey toward about $3 million and southern Saudi or Hormuz calls toward about $7 million, up from at least $100,000 before the wider war, according to the same Reuters reporting.
For Ethiopia, the Red Sea insurance story is not a distant Gulf problem. African Security Analysis’s September assessment argued that Houthi control of Yemen’s Red Sea approaches and Perim creates coercive leverage even without a formal blockade, because higher war-risk premiums, reduced vessel availability, and Cape of Good Hope diversions can deliver many of the economic effects of a partial closure. ASA named Djibouti as the African state most immediately exposed and Ethiopia as facing significant indirect exposure through dependence on the Djibouti corridor. That corridor still carries the bulk of Ethiopia’s seaborne trade. Earlier Ethiopian ministry figures for the 2025/26 financial year, reported previously by Birr Metrics and summarised in Mereja’s September 24 corridor piece, put Djibouti’s share of maritime-gateway cargo at about 96.7 percent. Those are earlier ministry numbers, not a new 2026-09-25 release, and they should be read as the standing logistics map rather than a fresh survey.
When underwriters mark Saudi Red Sea calls at 3 percent and southern ports near 7 percent, liner schedules and fuel-product voyages into the Gulf of Aden feel the same risk climate even when individual Ethiopian-bound ships are quoted closer to the non-Saudi 0.2 to 0.3 percent band. Charter rates, bunker costs, and precautionary diversions still raise the landed cost of diesel, jet fuel, fertiliser, medicines, and factory inputs before trucks leave Djibouti for the highlands. ASA’s earlier April warning, updated in September, listed freight, fuel, food, and fertilizer as the main transmission channels into African prices. Abiy Ahmed’s government continues to speak about multimodal reform and alternative ports. The standing Djibouti dependence shows how little of that talk has changed the bill that households and factories pay when Bab el-Mandeb stays in the high-risk box.
Northern fighting tightens the same lung from the land side. AFP and ACLED reporting this week places pressure on Afar approaches that feed the Djibouti corridor, while analysts say Tigrayan and allied operations may aim at cutting federal supply lines. If ocean premiums stay elevated and Afar roads or rail approaches become contested, Ethiopia faces a double squeeze: dearer maritime risk into Djibouti, and harder inland movement from Djibouti into the highlands. That combination hits consumer prices even when palace speeches call Red Sea access a national destiny and when Abiy Ahmed’s regime presents corridor projects as resilience.
Verification limits remain important. Reuters’ 3 percent and 7 percent figures are quoted premiums from industry sources who declined to be named, not a regulator’s published tariff. Dryad’s “handful of tankers” line is a security firm’s traffic snapshot, not a customs ledger. ASA’s Ethiopia exposure judgment is an analytical assessment. The 96.7 percent Djibouti share is an earlier ministry figure carried in prior reporting, not a fresh September 25 release. What the record does support is a sharp rise in Saudi-linked Red Sea war-risk quotes, Houthi leverage around Perim and Bab el-Mandeb, thin tanker traffic through the strait, and a Horn import system that still leans overwhelmingly on Djibouti. Until those premiums fall and Ethiopia actually spreads cargo at scale, Saudi Red Sea insurance is one more line item on Ethiopia’s freight bill.
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