Landlocked Ethiopia moves almost all of its seaborne trade through Djibouti. An analysis published by AllAfrica on October 1, republished from Addis Standard and dated September 30, says the latest Bab el-Mandeb disruption raises the cost of that dependence now. The analysis points to fuel, factory inputs and household goods. It says Ethiopia cannot shift a large share of cargo quickly when Red Sea insurance, freight delays or strait risk rise.
The analysis cites Ethiopia’s 2025/26 fiscal year transport figures. Total maritime import and export cargo reached about 17.57 million metric tons. The figures assign Djibouti about 96.71 percent, or about 15.34 million tons. They assign Berbera on the Gulf of Aden about 2.74 percent. They give Tadjoura about 1.23 percent and the Mombasa-Moyale corridor about 0.56 percent. As published, those shares add to a bit more than 100 percent.
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait does not need to close for importers to pay more. War risk premiums are extra insurance charges for voyages through waters with a higher risk of missile, drone or conflict damage. Higher premiums, longer Cape of Good Hope diversions, carrier surcharges, fewer sailings and uncertain delivery dates can raise costs before any formal blockade. The cited figures put fuel at about 4.23 million tons of Ethiopia’s imports in 2025/26. Road transport carried about 80 percent of inland freight. The Ethio-Djibouti railway handled about 19 percent. Air carried less than 1 percent.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published a spotlight on September 22 and updated it through late September. It said renewed Houthi attacks on commercial vessels since July 2026 increased pressure on the strait. Houthi control of Mokha, Perim Island and nearby coastal ground strengthened that position. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is about 32 kilometers wide. It links the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Weekly vessel traffic through the strait fell sharply after the July attacks. Red Sea shipping remains far below levels before the October 2023 attack wave. At that earlier level, weekly transit averaged about 80 vessels carrying 3.4 million metric tons, the Africa Center said.
After the 2023 and 2024 attacks, many shipping lines shifted around the Cape of Good Hope. The Africa Center said the detour adds up to two weeks and about 6,000 nautical miles. Insurance premiums for Red Sea transits rose from about 0.1 percent to about 0.7 to 1.0 percent of a ship’s value. The center said those rates can add roughly a million dollars per vessel for a round trip. It said Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somaliland lost traffic and face higher freight and insurance costs. East African importers, including Ethiopia, pay more for European chemicals and manufactured goods when transport costs rise. In a separate figure, the Africa Center said Ethiopia relies on Doraleh Port in Djibouti for about 90 percent of its trade. That figure differs from the 96.71 percent cargo share cited from the 2025/26 transport figures. The center also said fuel prices in Ethiopia rose sharply since April as import costs climbed.
United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations and the Joint Maritime Information Center kept the threat assessment for the southern Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb at SUBSTANTIAL in late September advisories. The advisories use the short forms UKMTO and JMIC. They said Houthi forces control Mokha, Dhubab, Mayun/Perim and nearby islands. Commercial traffic remains below levels before the mid July selective embargo messaging. The advisories said mainland and island positions shorten engagement ranges. They told mariners to maintain heightened security and prepare for short notice navigational directives.
Berbera gives Ethiopia another Gulf of Aden gateway. Its location differs from Djibouti. The Addis Standard analysis cited DP World work on Berbera’s deep water facilities and the wider Berbera Economic Zone. It said cargo still must clear the border, travel on reliable roads, reach Ethiopian dry ports and move to industrial centers. Berbera’s share in the cited figures was about 2.74 percent.
The January 2024 memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland formed part of the search for a second route. The Addis Standard analysis said Ethiopia presented the deal as sea access and port diversification. Somaliland linked recognition to the political bargain. Somalia rejected the deal as a threat to its sovereignty. A diplomatic crisis followed, including the Ankara process. The analysis said Berbera still holds value because of geography, infrastructure and proximity.
Assab and Massawa on Eritrea’s Red Sea coast lie close to northern Ethiopia. The analysis said both ports need political stability, secure transit, commercial agreements and inland links before they can carry large volumes. Mombasa and Lamu in Kenya offer a southern Indian Ocean option. The Mombasa-Moyale corridor handled a small share in the cited figures. Shipping lines can absorb a Cape diversion as an ocean cost. Ethiopia must still receive cargo through a port and haul it inland.
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