Mereja Forum

[Axumezana]

(1) The Tigrayan issue

This issue is related to political disagreement between Abiy and TPLF and the interference of Issaias on the Ethiopian internal issues and Abiy being hijacked by hardliners from Amhara that have a joint plan with Isaias to destroy TPLF.
It is very clear to every body at this stage that the problem cannot be solved through war. As a leader of 120 m people, Abiy should not continue gambling with endless war at the cost of the Ethiopian people. Therefore, Abiy has to abandon his relationship with Isaias and Amhara hardliners and immediately start peaceful negotiation with TPLF.





(2) The Egypt water issue has to be resolved on pragmatic approach as recommended below:

Egypt’s strategy of sustaining its water security through sabotaging and destabilizing Ethiopia and Sudan is no more a relevant strategy as Egypt needs more water reservoirs to be built both in Sudan and Ethiopia for sustaining its water security and cater for its growing population.

Hence, Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt have to appreciate the following for peaceful reconciliation:

- Creating jobs and feeding the rapidly growing population in the Horn of Africa/Ethiopia and in the countries of the Nile Basin demands governments to generate power for industrialization and to transform traditional farming to mechanized irrigated farming to produce sufficient food to ensure food security which requires more consumption of water. The domestic consumption of water also increases in proportion to the population growth.

- The Aswan High dam only stores one-year flow of the Nile water, whereas, global warming and other unpredictable climate changes could result in a drought that lasts to the biblical-proportion of up to seven years. In that case, the Aswan dam could dry with unimaginable consequences on Egypt’s 105m million growing population and makes Egypt’s current water security strategy null and void.

- The growing population of Egypt also requires more water than the storage capacity of the High Aswan dam. That necessitates the construction of additional reservoir dams either in Ethiopia and/or Sudan (building an additional dam in Egypt looks not practical).

- The Aswan high dam may be filled by silt within the next 300 to 500 years. How will Egypt manage such unavoidable fact with a huge population that is 95% dependent on the Nile water?
Considering the above points, it is expected that Egyptian water security strategists and the Egyptians government covertly want the construction of more dams (reservoirs) in Sudan and Ethiopia as far as their so called historical share is not significantly affected. They also know that dams built in Ethiopia along the deep Abay River Gorge could only be mainly used for hydroelectric power generation with lower evaporation loss and lower construction cost per volume. Egyptians are also considering other sources of water such us linking the Congo River with the White Nile and digging the Jonglei Canal in South Sudan which are good ideas but difficult to implement. If Egypt succeeds to dig the Jonglei Canal, the construction of dams on the Abay river is mandatory to regulate its flow and avoid flooding of Khartoum,
Therefore, storing water in the deep Abay Gorge is the most attractive option as it could store more water at lower cost and less evaporation loss and lower usage of water other than generating hydroelectric power by Ethiopia. However, Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt should negotiate and agree a win-win water share tripartite and bilateral agreements. Of course, all other Nile Basin countries like Uganda, Kenya, and South Sudan etc. should also agree with both Sudan and Egypt on how to share the White Nile water.


The Negotiation with Egypt must consider the following points:

• The Egyptians badly need the construction of dams in Ethiopia as far as there is an agreement that protects their interest (this is a driver for win-win negotiation). assuming two additional dams could be built on the Abay gorge with a minimum joint capacity of 150 billion cubic meter, Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan can store more than 220 billion cubic meter water that could use under a commercial arrangement.

• Population growth
By the year 2050 and 2100 the population of Ethiopia will reach 190m and 240m respectively. Hence, any water share agreement should consider such future population growth

• The economic value of the water flowing to Sudan and Egypt
Water is a commodity and is being traded globally. There is no any reason for Sudan and Egypt not to reach an agreement with Ethiopia to buy water.
As an example:
As of today, the annual flow of water from Ethiopia’s rivers to South Sudan and to Sudan is estimated to be 73 billion Cubic meters. Assuming ocean water salination cost is USD 0.40 per Cubic meter (this is the currently lowest cost according to new salination plants build by Israel) and assuming 25% of salination cost to be the price of each cubic meter of water flowing out of Ethiopia, the annual price of the total water out of Ethiopia is: USD 0.40/ cubic meter X 25% X 73 billion cubic meter = USD 7.3 billion per year
Assuming Ethiopia is willing to share 50% of the annual flow free of charge to both Sudan and Egypt (based on the principles of equitable usage of water), Ethiopia could charge both Sudan and Egypt USD3.65 billion per year to both Egypt and Sudan. Considering Egypt share is 78%( as per Egypt and Sudan agreement), Ethiopia could demand Egypt to pay Ethiopia about USD 3 billion per year. The above calculation does not include the economic value of fertile slit going out of Ethiopia with the water.

• Egypt wants Ethiopia to curtail its population growth and continue with the existing unsustainable rain fed agriculture instead of irrigated agriculture (these conditions should not be accepted by Ethiopia). Considering the erratic nature of rainfall mechanized irrigated agriculture is the only viable option for Ethiopia’s future food security

• Any agreement with Sudan and Egypt:

Should be conditional to both countries committing that they will not be directly or indirectly involved on any activity that destabilizes or harms the interests of Ethiopia such as security, economy and political interests.
o Ethiopia should be compensated for the water and silt its rivers are taking to both Egypt and Sudan.
o Should have exit provisions that enables agreed parties to revoke the agreement at any time based on defined evets of defaults.
o Should have specified time span and expiry date (it could be 15 to 20 years). This allows all parties to renegotiate new agreement (from zero draft) every 15 to 20 years.
o Egypt must abandon its claim of zero-sum historic rights
o Ethiopia’s sovereignty over its rivers in its territory and its right to build cascade of dams over its rivers and to use the water for irrigated farming should not be compromised
o As beneficiaries from the water from the Ethiopian dams(reservoirs) both Sudan and Egypt must contribute up to 50% of the dam construction cost (assuming Ethiopia will give them 50% the water flows to Sudan free of charge)