Has this anything to do with the creation of Bejastan, a country made up of Eastern Sudan and Western Eritrea? Check out the below article by the famous Ali Salim at Awate.
BEJASTAN
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So far, Sudan’s fate has not been any better than that of Eritrea. The Sudan, as we have known it, is gone for good. It is not even a probability for Sudanese policymakers that it is only a matter of time before Darfur and Eastern Sudan follow the example of the South, leaving the tribal coalition of Northern Sudanese drowning in its own mess. That may be a subject for another day. For now let us concentrate on the catalysts of change in the holy land of Bejastan. I have eliminated any colorations from the section below so that you may take the facts for the seriousness they deserve. Taken together, it is my hope that you see how the two parts of Bejastan have actually converged into one polity. We have reached a stage where the political question of the western Eritrean lowlands cannot be analyzed and hence resolved independently from the political question of Eastern Sudan. The argument is that when Eritreans speak to or of a lowlander, and Northern Sudanese speak to and of an Eastern Sudanese, both sides are actually talking to and of the same individual that you can identify by name.
FACTORS OF CONVERGENCE
Trade & Transportation
Those who have passed through the Sudan can visualize how interprovincial commerce in the country follows the highway as the only physical connection between the provinces. In the age of cyber commerce, this cannot be said any more about other countries but it is still true in Sudan. Port Sudan being the only port in Sudan, the highway linking the city with the rest of the country used to transverse Eastern Sudan connecting cities such as Kassala and Gedarif to the power center in Khartoum. The sense of being central to Sudanese economics used to bring a sense of belonging to Eastern Sudanese and helped maintain their distinctiveness from their cross-border cousins in the Eritrean lowlands.
In recent years, a new much shorter, and more efficient highway was constructed connecting Khartoum through Atbara in Northern Sudan to Port Sudan. Overnight, 100% of trade relations between Port Sudan and Khartoum was switched away from the good old highway to the new one, eliminating the significance of much of Eastern Sudan to the Sudanese economy. With it, of course, the people to people connection that trade between Eastern Sudanese and Northerners was almost eliminated.
Qatar came with a rescue mission and saved Eastern Sudan from collapsing by constructing a highway that links Kassalla to Ali Gidir and the rest of Eritrea. A second rescue mission came from the Lord himself when Eritrean ports turned into Ghost houses, cement and other merchandise flooded from Port Sudan and cotton and grain through Gedarif passed through Kassala making its way to Ali Gidir and beyond. With it, of course, came a new found excitement of people to people relations. Today, a Northern Sudanese has no business coming to Kassala unless traveling to Eritrea for a honeymoon and a Tigrigna has no business in heading to Kassala except for transit to Libya.
Citizenship Policy
As you know, it has been a few years now since the Sudanese government has established an “Umda” (tribal chief) under the “Naziriya” (chief of a tribal coalition) of one of the major tribal coalitions of Eastern Sudan for each tribe (ethnic group) in the Eritrean lowlands (and highlander Muslims to be exact). The function of these Umdas is to guarantee limited citizenship rights for their constituents. I say “limited” because, unlike a regular Eastern Sudanese Umda whose constituents are entitled to tribal land ownership, the constituents of Eritrean lowlander Umdas are landless citizens. The significance of this seemingly irrelevant metaphor is the presumption that there exist Eastern Sudanese citizens whose land has yet to be claimed. This is not an isolated policy by the way. The metaphor used as a policy instrument has in many instances of prolonged occupation served the purpose, the most notable being the case of Palestinian refugees who were accepted as citizens in Lebanon and Jordan.
Contrary to the Sudanese government’s promotion of the initiative as an expression of goodwill to welcome Eritrean lowlanders, there are real developments on the ground that have compelled this policy. The following are some:
There have been numerous deals between the Sudan and the PFDJ to enable the latter to use Eastern Sudan as dumping grounds for unwanted communities of the lowlands in exchange for pimping border-guards of the PFDJ.
Eritrea’s protracted refusal of the repatriation of lowlander refugees from Eastern Sudan has greatly reduced the sense of Eritrean citizenship among Eritrean lowlanders in Eastern Sudan leaving them no option but to innovate on ways of mingling beyond recognition. This in turn, has transformed the simple procedure of granting citizenship in Eastern Sudan into a legal nightmare that cannot be resolved without raising serious political issues in the region.
The disproportionate spread of political Islam in Eastern Sudan primarily championed by activists eager to assimilate by declaring their communities more catholic than the pope has attracted the appetite of political entrepreneurs of the ruling party. The emergence of Eastern Sudan (practically Bejastan) as a major voting block for the ruling Islamists has repeatedly proven its worth in winning Sudan’s national elections. Ironically, it is the progressive movement (communists on top) who promote the traditionally right-wing agenda of racism and xenophobia calling to seal borders and build walls in Sudan today.
Eastern Sudanese Activism
As you know, the so-called ‘Eastern Sudanese armed opposition’ of Rashaida bandits and Eastern Sudanese opportunists hosted by Eritrea in the 1990s ended with the peace agreement. Once in power however the widely publicized peace agreement gave an emerging class of Eastern Sudanese activists the incentive to boost their constituency for a bigger share of the cake. A whole industry of activist advocacy reflecting the oneness of Bejastan took a life of its own in political games limiting the reach of the Northern Sudanese ethnocracy in Eastern Sudan and the distinctiveness or western lowlanders in Eritrea. You may not believe this but today, for instance, two types of Eritreans cross the border: Eritrean citizens hailing from the highlands (specifically Tigrigna) are required to present Eritrean passports and proper entry visas by the PFDJ and Sudanese authorities at border crossing points on both sides of the boundary. Eritrean citizens hailing from the lowlands are only requested (by the same authorities) to present paper permits (“tesreeH”) issued by the nearest immigration offices.
Sudan’s chronic civil wars have through the years required a constant flow of youngsters to enlist in the army. In the rage of these wars, a massive number of Bejastan youngsters (without distinction) were forcefully conscripted and a large number paid the ultimate sacrifice. The contribution of today’s Eritrean lowlanders in Sudanese civil wars was by far greater than the contribution of the Eritrean lowlander of the 1950s some of whom came back to carry Awate’s torch in the early 1960s. This phenomenon, on the one hand, gave citizenship with distinction to those who returned and the thousands of “Gold Star Families”, and on the other hand enhanced the legitimacy and voice of the political entrepreneurs of Eritrean origin. Unmistakably Eritrean citizens openly acquired high-level political portfolios traditionally exclusively reserved for Northern Sudanese supremacists."
read the full article at
http://awate.com/bejastan/