Mereja Forum

Abe Abraham wrote: ↑

10 Jul 2021, 09:21

Iran: Ethiopia will be a combination of African Afghanistan and Vietnam for the American invaders.

FOREWORD

Military personnel who have experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Vietnam, as well as senior leaders and military historians alike, will find this book by Dr. Chris Mason thought-provoking and useful. Dr. Mason examines indigenous personnel issues at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war and uses empirical data and exhaustive research to argue that all three wars were lost before the first shots were fired—not on the battlefield, but at the strategic level of war.

The United States interpreted all three conflicts as insurgencies, Mason writes, when in fact all three were civil wars in which the United States took a side. Success was never possible from the outset, his provocative thesis argues, because none of the three countries were nations for which the majority of their citizens were willing to fight and die. Nation-building is a slow, evolutionary, internal process through which the political identity of the peoples within a country’s borders matures over centuries to transcend tribalism, secularism, and ethnic divides, Mason argues, until it reaches a pervasive sense of nationhood. “Nation-building,” and democracy-importation on the point of foreign bayonets, this book maintains, is impossible.

Throughout this book, Mason continually examines the issues from new perspectives and introduces new tactical, operational, and strategic paradigms. His explication in Part II of what will happen in Afghanistan year-by-year from 2015 to 2019 unless major changes occur in theater is bold, captivating, stark—and credible. The contributions to operational war gaming in Afghanistan in Appendix II alone make this publication a must-read. His comparative statistical and qualitative analyses of the Afghan National Security Forces today, and those in Vietnam and Iraq at their respective points of collapse, are no less eye-opening and thought provoking. His examination of the bureaucratic and psychological obstacles to policy making and objective strategic analysis in Part III should be absorbed by every military officer in the United States.

Wedi wrote: ↑

23 Aug 2021, 18:25

Abe Abraham wrote: ↑

10 Jul 2021, 09:21

Iran: Ethiopia will be a combination of African Afghanistan and Vietnam for the American invaders.

Abe Abraham, look at this research paper/book written in 2015.
US America's embarrassment in Afghan was expected to come

Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press

THE STRATEGIC LESSONS UNLEARNED FROM VIETNAM, IRAQ, AND AFGHANISTAN:
Why the Afghan National Security Forces Will Not Hold, and the Implications for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan

M. Chris Mason June 2015

FOREWORD

Military personnel who have experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Vietnam, as well as senior leaders and military historians alike, will find this book by Dr. Chris Mason thought-provoking and useful. Dr. Mason examines indigenous personnel issues at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war and uses empirical data and exhaustive research to argue that all three wars were lost before the first shots were fired—not on the battlefield, but at the strategic level of war.

The United States interpreted all three conflicts as insurgencies, Mason writes, when in fact all three were civil wars in which the United States took a side. Success was never possible from the outset, his provocative thesis argues, because none of the three countries were nations for which the majority of their citizens were willing to fight and die. Nation-building is a slow, evolutionary, internal process through which the political identity of the peoples within a country’s borders matures over centuries to transcend tribalism, secularism, and ethnic divides, Mason argues, until it reaches a pervasive sense of nationhood. “Nation-building,” and democracy-importation on the point of foreign bayonets, this book maintains, is impossible.

Throughout this book, Mason continually examines the issues from new perspectives and introduces new tactical, operational, and strategic paradigms. His explication in Part II of what will happen in Afghanistan year-by-year from 2015 to 2019 unless major changes occur in theater is bold, captivating, stark—and credible. The contributions to operational war gaming in Afghanistan in Appendix II alone make this publication a must-read. His comparative statistical and qualitative analyses of the Afghan National Security Forces today, and those in Vietnam and Iraq at their respective points of collapse, are no less eye-opening and thought provoking. His examination of the bureaucratic and psychological obstacles to policy making and objective strategic analysis in Part III should be absorbed by every military officer in the United States.