Mereja Forum

[Sadacha Macca]

''By the mid 1990s incidents involving land erupted in communities along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border. Whereas in the past traditional forms of dispute resolution would have dealt with local disputes, these disputes were taken out of the hands of local communities by regional officials who escalated the conflict.
In 1997 TPLF officials in Tigray complicated political relations by printing a new map of Tigray for use in its schools: the map incorporated areas along its northern border claimed by Eritrea.
Political relations were further compounded when, in December 1997, Ethiopia printed new currency notes which incorporated the TPLF's contested map of Tigray.
Ethiopian actions were seen by Eritrea as proof that the TPLF was seeking to realize its dream of 'Greater Tigray' by incorporating Tigrinya speaking areas of Eritrea.
In mid-1997 Ethiopian troops entered the area of Bada [claimed by Eritrea], prompting President Isaias to write to Prime Minister Meles to complain about the incursion.
Isaias is said to have proposed the creation of a Joint Border Commission to resolve border disputes [Plaut 2005: 15-16]. The Commission met briefly in November 1997 but did not meet again until May 8th 1998 [the start of the war] and it failed to agree to mechanisms that might address the issue [Gilkes and Plaut 1999: 18-19; Tekeste Negash and Tronvoll 2000: 26-9].

By early 1997- a growing number of problems- conflicts over land, taxes on trade, monetary policy, currency regulations, etc-had emerged between Eritrea and Ethiopia, in part because the two ruling parties relied on the informal political relationship between the two heads of state [rather than establish an inter-state/institutional framework or org. with the authority to demarcate their shared border and agree on common policies].

Events rapidly escalated. In July 1997 Ethiopian troops entered the area of Bada-Adi Murug in Eritrea and set up administrative offices [Eritrea 2005].
In early May 1998 Ethiopian troops entered the area of Badme, where they allegedly harasses local Eritreans. Eritrean troops were told not to intervene because the president was dealing with the issue.
Shortly afterwards, and a little further to the north, Eritrean soldiers on patrol were confronted by 25 Ethiopian soldiers who fanned out around them and opened fire, wounding 3 Eritreans.
The remainder of the Eritrean platoon came running to the scene and found their wounded colleagues but as it was dark, decided to camp.
I paraphrased here an official Eritrean account of what followed:

The group spent the night sleeping in the open and in the early morning while it was still mostly dark they heard unfamiliar voices.
The strangers were speaking fluent Tigrinya and so the group felt reassured...
The strangers identified themselves as Ethiopian soldiers and asked for a chance to talk about the previous day's events.
The commander and five other soldiers stepped forward and the Ethiopians shot them.
The remainder of the squad ran for cover while the Ethiopians [Tigrayans] continued their attack.

Ethiopia's only response to this account was to deny the location of the incident.
This incident rapidly transformed socio-political relations in the region from a situation of growing tension to open hostility and violent conflict.
In effect it reopened old memories of 'rivalry and long felt chains of collective resentment' between the two nations [Triluzi undated: 2].
And the incident gave the political leadership in both countries justification for inflammatory comments that contributed to further violence and which directed public attention to the presence of enemy 'aliens' living in the country.

Following the incident Eritrea mobilized troops and demanded that Ethiopia withdraw from its territory. As Abbink [1998: 558-9] noted at the time:

By forcefully bringing up the border issue, the Eritrean government has put pressure on the Ethiopian leadership and tried to force it to return to a more Eritrea-favourable position by way of inducing the pro-Eritrea factions in the ruling EPRDF to assert themselves.

If this was the perception in Eritrea it may have been misconceived given the extent to which relations with Ethiopia had dramatically changed since the 1980s when Eritrean national identity was defined in opposition to 'the Ethiopians' [Tronvoll 1998, 1999]

In Ethiopia, public attitudes toward Eritrea were strongly effected by EPRDF statements which were reported by the independent press and used to create a 'war of words,' a massive propaganda effort [Triluzi undated, p. 5].
Ethiopian media used 'insulting epithets and debasing accusations' which linked 'Eritrean aggression to Italian colonial ambitions in the region and to the legacy of racist arrogance they had left behind'. [ibid].
The media created and sustained widespread anti-Eritrean resentment, which played on tropes and images of the EPLF/Eritrean government as racists and fascists and it identified 'Eritreans' as the 'enemy within' allegedly because they were exploiting their dual citizen-ship to accumulate power and wealth.
Triulzi argues that the effect of government propaganda, nationalist media coverage and rising tension was to create massive support for the government's pursuit of the war against Eritrea and 'Eritreans.'


[Nationalism, Law and Statelessness: Grand Illusions in the Horn of Africa
By John R. Campbell, Pages 28-30]