New pillars of Egyptian foreign policy
Many changes in the region have overshadowed the balance of foreign policy in the Egyptian administration.
Muhammad Abul Fadl ( Egptian writer )
The regional crises facing Egypt revealed that it needs a new foreign policy, as it has succeeded in weaving a large network of relations with multiple powers, but it did not reflect positively on it or contribute to facilitating the task of solving the problems it faces, as most of them are still suspended or static.
The developments in the regional and international systems were reflected in Egypt and others, where the intensity of conflicts played a role in limiting the traditional capabilities of foreign policy, and the effect of the intertwining of conflicts and the diversity of their parties on the state’s vitality in reaping quick fruits, not to mention the transformation in the plans of major powers, such as withdrawal from tensions And get involved in it.
There are many changes in the region that have overshadowed the balance of foreign policy in the Egyptian administration, but there are two striking elements that have greater influences, which force Cairo to adjust its perceptions after reducing dependence on them, the first is the fluctuation in relations with the United States, and the second the apparent imbalance in the Arab system, collectively and individually. .
In detailing each element, many determinants are evident that confirm the size of the change that has occurred, and the developments that may lead to it in the foreign policy of Egypt, and the new rituals it imposes in order to be able to cope with the upcoming changes, and the developments may compel it to adopt a different strategy from what it used to be. For the past five decades.
Regarding the American element, Washington is no longer the lever on which Cairo relies, and its strength was established with the signing of the peace agreement with Israel and its political and security implications. President Joe Biden's administration tends to keep a distance from Egypt, while acknowledging the constants that take a military direction, which means that there is a disparity in Details both internally and externally.
Let go of the confusion that the US administration is going through about the issues it deals with, and stress that it does not support the Egyptian perceptions, or more precisely, it does not stand with it in a single trench in the controversial files, and if it appears in the Palestinian file close to its vision of the two-state solution, but it did not Take actions that support this trend.
Cairo faced suffering in Libya during the administration of President Donald Trump, who was said to be the biggest supporter of Egypt at the time, and was forced to open up to various forces to coordinate with it, and Washington was one of them, and the situation continues in the fluctuating pattern, and it may change negatively if the United States finds the need to harass Egypt.
The same situation has been repeated with the Renaissance Dam crisis. Although Cairo is aware of the strength of the American role and its ability to exert pressure on Ethiopia, the Biden administration is reluctant to help solve an intractable crisis that accompanies tributaries that affect Egypt and its foreign behavior, and in the case of adopting a rough option, it may find itself. In an extended clash with Washington.
Washington is no longer the lever on which Cairo relies, and its strength was established with the signing of the peace agreement with Israel and its political and security implications. Joe Biden's administration tends to keep a distance from Egypt.
Cairo realized that its Western tools in general are difficult to rely on for support or participation in solving the external crises to which it is exposed, some of which are existential, which leads to the trend towards powers such as Russia and China, because the majority of European active countries adhere to the circulation in the orbit of the United States, and the independent margin that moves In it, it will not be allowed to benefit Cairo.
The problem comes from that any major political turn toward Russia and China leads to changes in the balance of power in the region. Cairo’s success in opening up militarily to contradictory powers from the East and the West came within contexts related to the equation of arms trade, which is acceptable at certain limits, while it goes beyond the permissible limit. With regard to the types of armament and equipment that brings pressure, as evident is the warnings that were directed at Cairo after signing agreements with Moscow to acquire advanced Sukhoi planes.
The situation regarding foreign policy seems far from the known biases, because adopting positions in support of Egypt forces it to pay an exorbitant tax. No country offers free forgiveness instruments in light of the keenness on the multiplicity of the movement’s fronts following the collapse of the ideas involved in the traditional policy axes.
There may be a country that agrees with a second country in one file and disagrees with it in another, for the total and decisive support on ideological bases has almost ended in the world, which requires sacrifices in perceptions that stem from the process of exchanging interests, which is what Egypt finds itself in front of it if it wants to establish the bid on Russia For example, and bear the consequences of leaving the US cordon.
Moscow, which enjoys the external pressures on Cairo, can find an opportunity to reformulate its relations with it in a way that brings it closer to its relationship with the Iranian and Syrian models, or even the Turkish, which has achieved success for both, taking into account the relative differences in the behavior adopted by Ankara in several regions and is not consistent with the equation that Cairo establishes it for itself in foreign policy and adheres to non-interference in the affairs of other countries.
As for the Arab circle, it is noticeable that the Gulf ocean, which was one of the safety valves and one of the central constants in Egyptian politics, began to change, especially with both Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, and the divergence appeared in managing the crisis with Qatar and Turkey, and strengthened with Iran, as Egypt maintained its quiet relationship With Tehran and its tails in the region.
The acceleration of relations between the Gulf states and Israel, without coordination with Egypt, contributed greatly to the current gap, and made it rethink the common safety net, because every progress that Israel makes on the level of normalization and its extension is an opponent from the balance of the Cairo regional movement, and it must search for new frameworks. Enable it to compensate for the loss of this network in the future.
The crisis increased with the disappointment of the Egyptian bet on Saudi Arabia and the UAE in putting pressure on Ethiopia to ease its stubbornness in the Renaissance Dam crisis, as
the two countries made huge investments to benefit from the development results resulting from it,
and they appeared as if they were comfortable with the dilemma in Egypt, which prompts it to think about a great rotation, if it continues The case the way it is.
The compass of Egyptian thinking is moving towards openness to Iraq, strengthening relations with Jordan, consolidating them with Sudan, and looking away at the countries of the Arab Maghreb, to strengthen the pillars of Egypt's foreign policy, but these countries have deep problems that will not allow them to help Cairo. Rather, they are waiting for material and moral aid that might Egypt cannot provide it.
The natural result of these complications leads to a gradual dissolution of Arab commitments, which means a retreat inward, to the detriment of the Egyptian interests, whose setbacks expand with each retreat, so they must search for productive frameworks that represent new levers in its foreign policy.